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Abstract In evolutionary medicine, researchers characterize some outcomes
as evolutionary mismatch. Mismatch problems arise as the result of organ-
isms living in environments to which they are poorly adapted, typically as
the result of some rapid environmental change. Depression, anxiety, obesity,
myopia, insomnia, breast cancer, dental problems, and numerous other nega-
tive health outcomes have all been characterized as mismatch problems. The
exact nature of evolutionary mismatch itself is unclear, however. This leads to
a lack of clarity about the sorts of problems that evolutionary mismatch can
actually explain. Resolving this challenge is important not only for the evolu-
tionary health literature, but also because the notion of evolutionary mismatch
involves central concepts in evolutionary biology: fitness, evolution in changing
environments, and so forth.
In this paper, I examine two characterizations of mismatch currently in the
literature. I propose that we conceptualize mismatch as a relation between an
optimal environment and an actual environment. Given an organism and its
particular physiology, the optimal environment is the environment in which
the organism’s fitness is maximized: in other words, the optimal environment
is that in which the organism’s fitness is as high as it can possibly be. The
actual environment is the environment in which the organism actually finds
itself. To the extent that there is a discordance between the organism’s actual
and optimal environments, there is an evolutionary mismatch. In the paper,
I show that this account of mismatch gives us the right result when other
accounts fail, and provides useful targets for investigation.
Keywords Evolutionary mismatch · Developmental mismatch · Evolution ·
Biology · Mismatch · Adaptation · Environment
Rick Morris




In the fields of evolutionary psychology and evolutionary medicine, evolution-
ary explanations for health outcomes characterize some negative outcomes as
mismatch problems. Roughly, mismatch problems are those problems which
arise as the result of an organism living in an environment to which it is
poorly adapted, typically as the result of some rapid environmental change
or migration. Depression, anxiety, obesity, myopia, insomnia, breast cancer,
dental problems, and numerous other negative health outcomes have all been
characterized as mismatch problems at various times. These sorts of outcomes
are often referred to as evolutionary mismatch.
However, relatively little work1 has been done to define the concept of
evolutionary mismatch. Currently, the mismatch concept appears to be char-
acterized in only vague terms, with characterizations often relying on biological
examples to do the heavy lifting. Resolving this vagueness is a necessary step
in untangling the claims being made.
In the next section of the paper, I will discuss the concept of evolutionary
mismatch a bit more as it appears in the empirical literature. I do this to
help the reader get some grip on the biological phenomena of interest, and
to provide some motivation for the project. As noted in Lloyd et al. (2011),
evolutionary mismatch (or something like it) seems to have implications for
evolutionary biology as a whole. Although the concept has explicitly been used
only in a limited body of research, the idea of fit to environment and the causal
impact of environmental change on evolutionary change are objects of central
interest to biologists.
In the third section of the paper, I will briefly consider both accounts
of evolutionary mismatch given in the philosophical literature to date (Lloyd
et al. (2011) and Cofnas (2016)), and suggest that both approaches are helpful
but can be profitably revised.
In the fourth section of the paper, I develop the primary account, which
argues that evolutionary mismatch should be understood as a discordance
between an organism’s optimal environment (given its physiology) and the
organism’s actual environment. To the extent that the organism has lower
fitness in its actual environment than in its optimal environment, there is an
evolutionary mismatch.
In the fifth section of the paper, I motivate the primary account and show
that the conceptual moves are plausible and that they cohere with existing
scientific literature on mismatch.
In the final section of the paper, I consider some objections. In the ob-
jections, I also consider broader questions of the scientific relevance of the
view.
1In the philosophical literature to date, the only detailed attempts of which I am aware
are Lloyd et al. (2011) and Cofnas (2016). Garson (2015) discusses a certain kind of mismatch
but does not give a general characterization.
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2 What is evolutionary mismatch?
To get a handle on the basic idea of mismatch, we need to understand one
of the key components of alleged mismatches: the ancestral environment, also
known as the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA).2 The EEA is
the environment to which a given population is primarily adapted, the selection
pressures of which have driven much of the population’s evolution. Mismatch
theorists tend to argue that Homo sapiens has an EEA, frequently identified
as the African savannah approximately 50,000 years ago and earlier.3 Having
spent dozens of millennia evolving in response to the particular selection pres-
sures of foraging life on the savannah and relatively little time evolving since
leaving Africa (and leaving foraging), Homo sapiens is still primarily adapted
to that environment.
Contemporary environments, on the other hand, tend—particularly in the
developed world—to be very different from a foraging life, in all sorts of plau-
sibly selection-relevant ways: modern diets are more palatable and calories are
easier to obtain; day-to-day life is more sedentary; women have more menstrual
cycles; social relationships are more diffuse; and so forth.4
A mismatch arises when ancient genes—genes which evolved to meet the
challenges of the EEA—run up against novel situations in contemporary en-
vironments to which those genes are not well-adapted. The mismatch, it is
alleged, sometimes results in deleterious consequences for adaptedness (i.e. re-
productive fitness) or health.5 As Cosmides and Tooby (1997) put it, “...our
modern skulls house a Stone Age mind.”
This sort of mismatch comes in three parts: the EEA, the contemporary
environment, and the negative outcome due to the contemporary environment.
(To be clear, again: this is just a sketch of the idea. My intent is only to give the
reader an impression of the idea in play.) In order to fill out the picture a bit,
2Credit for coining the term is typically given to Bowlby (1982), cf. Barr (1999), Tooby
and Cosmides (2005), Gluckman and Hanson (2006), Taylor (2015). A related term is ‘ances-
tral environment’, preferred by Lloyd et al. (2011) but treated as roughly equivalent to EEA.
I am using the established EEA terminology for brevity, and I think that even mismatch
theorists who eschew the particular terminology will recognize its theoretical analogues in
their own accounts. The EEA is really a cluster of related concepts and gets used in various
ways—Lloyd et al. (2011), for example, describe traits rather than populations as having ‘an-
cestral environments’—but all I need at the moment is for the reader to understand roughly
what the EEA is. Those already familiar with the term should take my use of EEA as a
gesture at the phenomenon of interest rather than a commitment to the particular claims of
Tooby and Cosmides’s evolutionary psychology. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this
point.
3See, e.g., Lindeberg (2010) 30. As I said in footnote 2, for the sake of brevity I am
eliding the full set of views here: some theorists prefer to think of each trait or mechanism
as having a specific EEA.
4See, e.g., Nesse and Williams (1994), Trevathan (1999), Tooby and Cosmides (2005),
Gluckman and Hanson (2006), Keller and Nesse (2006), Gluckman et al. (2009), Lindeberg
(2010), Lieberman (2013), and Aktipis et al. (2015).
5Whether we are being given a story about fitness outcomes or health outcomes can
sometimes be a bit fuzzy. More on this in section 6.2 on page 16.
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I will give two examples of mismatch hypotheses which have been proposed in
the evolutionary health literature: scurvy and myopia.
Vitamin C (ascorbic acid) is an essential nutrient for Homo sapiens, play-
ing a role in wound healing and immune function, among other important
functions. Though most mammals are capable of synthesizing vitamin C, this
ability appears to have been lost in the haplorhine lineage—the tarsiers, mon-
keys, and apes (Pollock and Mullin (1987)). Consequently, humans must obtain
sufficient vitamin C through diet. Scurvy is a disease resulting from a lack of
adequate vitamin C, and is particularly well-known for historically aﬄicting
sailors on long ocean voyages, who typically had extremely limited access to vi-
tamin C-rich fruits and vegetables. In the EEA, however, humans presumably
had extensive access to fruits and vegetables, providing abundant vitamin C.
(Eaton and Konner (1985) estimate that contemporary hunter-gatherers have
a daily vitamin C intake of 392.3 mg/day, approximately nine times the U.S.
government-recommended daily minimum at the time of the study. Konner
and Eaton (2010) updates these numbers to approximately 500 mg/day and
approximately five times, respectively.) The mismatch arises when an organism
from a species which evolved in a vitamin C-rich environment, and which re-
quires vitamin C to live, is placed in a vitamin C-poor environment. In other
words, humans are adapted to the selection pressures of an environment in
which vitamin C can be obtained through adequate nutrition—not to those of
an environment in which vitamin C cannot be so obtained.6
Another hypothesized, though controversial, example: humans evolved spend-
ing most of their time outside, using their eyes to distinguish objects near and
far. In childhood, continual work at short distances (particularly close-in work
like reading) does not allow the eye to develop properly, resulting in a longer
eye which is not able to focus light from distant objects to form sharp images.
In other words, the human eye evolved in outside environments where objects
at both close and far distances were regularly available to act as stimuli in
optical development. In contemporary environments, focus at distance is less
common, resulting in myopia among humans already prone to it. The mis-
match here, then, is the lack of necessary stimuli during development—stimuli
provided by the EEA, but not by the contemporary environment.7
The mismatch concept has utility beyond these human examples. Lloyd
et al. (2011) describe mismatch as “central to evolutionary theory.” Examples
in the rest of the paper should illustrate this, and I will say more to underscore
this point in the conclusion.
6For more discussion of this example, see Gluckman et al. (2009).
7For more extensive discussion of this highly simplified example and related hypotheses,
see Nesse and Williams (1994); Gluckman et al. (2009); Lindeberg (2010); Lieberman (2013).
By contrast, Tideman et al. (2016) found that myopia had a stronger association with serum
vitamin D levels than with time spent outdoors, indicating that low vitamin D may be
implicated in myopia. Pan et al. (2017) suggest that the evidence supporting the vitamin
D hypothesis is still insufficiently strong, however, and argue that the current state of the
evidence favors time spent outdoors as a more likely protective factor than higher serum
vitamin D. I use the simplified example above in part because it is more popular in the
evolutionary health literature.
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3 Previous mismatch accounts
Evolutionary mismatch has thus far received relatively little focused philosoph-
ical attention. Although some particular mismatch claims have been explored,8
the basic conceptual framework of evolutionary mismatch has yet to be fully
elucidated. In this section, I will briefly discuss the two philosophical papers
(one unpublished) which have attempted to describe mismatch in substantial
detail.9 I will outline some worries for each approach if they are taken to be
exhaustive accounts of evolutionary mismatch. I think both accounts shed im-
portant light on the forms that evolutionary mismatch can take, however, and
I see my work here as an attempt to build on theirs rather than to overthrow
them.
3.1 Lloyd et. al’s mismatch primer
After a 2011 pair of workshops on evolutionary mismatch put on by the Evo-
lution Institute and the National Evolutionary Synthesis Center, Lloyd et al.
wrote an introduction to an intended (but never published) special issue of
Evolutionary Applications focused on mismatch.10 The paper is intended to
serve as a primer on evolutionary mismatch, introducing key concepts, dis-
cussing biological cases, and laying out the theoretical importance of concep-
tual work on mismatch. Lloyd et al. (2011) say that evolutionary mismatch
“can be defined as a negative consequence that results from a trait that evolved
in one environment being placed in another environment.” On this account,
mismatch is an outcome caused by a given trait’s lack of fit to an environment
relative to the trait’s ancestral environment. Importantly, Lloyd et al. state
that ancestral environments “must be defined separately for each trait.” Thus,
a particular trait may have negative consequences in a new environment (E2)
relative to its EEA (E1). Lloyd et al. use the example of RubisCO (ribulose
bisphosphate carboxylase/oxygenase), an ancient enzyme used by most au-
totrophs in carbon fixation (Tabita et al. (2007)). (I add more detail to their
example here but I believe I preserve its spirit.) To function properly, however,
RubisCO requires a minimal concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. When
the concentration of CO2 drops too low, RubisCO can no longer fix carbon for
the organism. (Nisbet et al. (2007)) Thus, Lloyd et al. contend, in any oxygen-
rich environment RubisCO will result in a mismatch. In cyanobacteria, for
example, this (putative) mismatch is ameliorated by pathways which trans-
port CO2 to the carboxysome, “a microcompartment containing RubisCO in
8See, e.g., Buller (2006).
9Garson (2015) gives a sketch of evolutionary mismatch as well, but I take the scope
of the account to be a particular kind of mismatch. Thus, I will treat it here as subsumed
under Cofnas (2016), due in part to the latter’s use of the former. My thanks to Justin
Garson for calling my attention to his work here.




which elevated CO2 is sequestered.” (Nisbet et al. (2007)) Lloyd et al. say that
in some cases, like RubisCO, mismatches “can become permanent features of
life” which are compensated for rather than eliminated by further evolution.
Although it makes an important contribution to philosophical work on
mismatch, the paper takes the (in my view) surprising position that it will
typically make sense to talk about particular traits causing mismatch in some
environments, with that mismatch being compensated for by the emergence of
new traits. Let us look at the RubisCO case again: on the view in Lloyd et al.
(2011), RubisCO causes a mismatch in all high-oxygen environments regardless
of additional traits which may alleviate the always-present mismatch. It is
unclear to me, however, why we ought to carve up the traits this way: why
should the traits be seen as atomic rather than compound? In other words:
rather than saying that RubisCO (R) causes a mismatch and compensating
traits (C) do not, perhaps the trait R ∧ ¬C causes a mismatch but the trait
R ∧ C does not. Organisms’ traits rarely exist in pure A/¬A isolation: there
are costs and benefits to suites of traits taken as wholes rather than merely to
atomic traits. Thus, the view advanced by Lloyd et al. seems (at least as they
use it in the RubisCO case) to suggest that traits can involve mismatches even
when they are part of fitness-enhancing wholes. (Similar to the worry about
excessive atomization in Lloyd (2015), it is also unclear to me that RubisCO
can be treated as biologically distinct from other cellular mechanisms in the
way Lloyd et al. describe.)
Now, Lloyd et al. acknowledge the challenges inherent to individuating
traits, and they might point to a number of ways to identify RubisCO as a
distinct trait: its function, the specific genes which code for it, and so forth.
In this case, however, I worry that individuating RubisCO like this might
serve to obscure more than clarify. As noted earlier, RubisCO still serves a
fitness-enhancing role when the organism is in a low-CO2 environment: it al-
lows the organism to fix carbon. Some organisms which existed with a ¬R
mutation would presumably experience drastically reduced fitness, which is
surely a negative outcome of interest. Yet this implies (by hypothesis) that
¬R would entail a mismatch, just as R (by their stipulation). I find this result
counterintuitive. The response here might be to point out that R is a trait
which evolved in a low-oxygen environment, and so it can lead to a mismatch
when it exists in a high-oxygen environment; ¬R is a novel trait and so en-
vironmental change for a ¬R organism cannot result in a mismatch, however
profound the negative consequences for fitness. If that is the case, they might
argue that even though both R and ¬R result in fitness harms, only R has
the history necessary for it to ‘count’ as a mismatch. I worry that this only
exacerbates the problem, however, as it suggests that an evolutionary mis-
match cannot result as the emergence of a new trait with poor ‘fit’ to the
current environment. (Indeed, they implicitly exclude this possibility.) I find
it quite plausible to think that there is a mismatch when a novel trait is mal-
adaptive in the current environment—at least if said trait would be neutral
or adaptive in some environments. I would consider it a theoretical virtue for
an account of mismatch to be able to handle a broader range of ways that
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organisms with certain traits can have poor fit to their environment. If the
reader’s intuition runs toward the restriction of a specific evolutionary history
of the mismatch-producing trait, then they may find little here to worry them
about the account in Lloyd et al. (2011) and thus little reason to prefer my
view to theirs. Indeed, that intuition may even militate against the account
I develop here. I discuss this more in the overbroadness objection in 6.4 on
page 18.
The motivation in Lloyd et al. (2011) for thinking of RubisCO this way
may be this: “Human efforts to ameliorate mismatches to our current envi-
ronment sometimes bear an intriguing resemblance to the traits that evolved
to ameliorate the effects of oxygen on RubisCO.” I am sympathetic to this
point, but I think it is unnecessary to insist on a mismatch persisting after the
fitness effects have been ameliorated. Consequently, I think their view includes
some non-mismatch cases (e.g., plausibly, RubisCO) and excludes some cases
of mismatch (e.g. the ¬R organism).
It is worth noting here that I have treated the Lloyd et al. picture of mis-
match as fitness-focused, though they actually allow for the “negative conse-
quence” of interest to be a negative fitness or health effect. This distinction is
important to track, in that changes in health do not inevitably entail changes
in fitness: we might think, here, of diseases which appear so late in life that
their fitness effects are negligible. The evolutionary health literature explicitly
acknowledges that selection works on fitness and thus may not select against
traits which harm health but not fitness (cf. Nesse and Williams (1994): 235-
236). Sometimes, however (as I said in footnote 5), mismatch talk elides health
and fitness effects. To keep the phenomena in sharper focus, I have chosen to
treat mismatch as a fitness issue. I discuss this further in the welfare objection
in section 6.2 on page 16.
With all that said, I want to emphasize that although I differ with Lloyd et
al. over their particular definition of mismatch, the paper includes many keen
insights: the centrality of mismatch-sounding themes to evolutionary biology,
the importance of successfully individuating the traits and environments of
interest, and the utility of the mismatch concept outside of the human cases
which seem to be the focus of most of the literature on mismatch.
3.2 Cofnas’s teleofunctional account
The other paper, Cofnas (2016), defines evolutionary mismatch as “deviations
in the environment that render biological traits unable, or impaired in their
ability, to produce their selected effects.” Here, Cofnas draws on an account of
proper function of a trait characterized in terms of the adaptive function of the
trait. (‘Proper function’ can refer to Neanderian proper function, or Millika-
nian direct proper function or Millikanian invariant derived proper function.)
An environment which deviates from an organism’s ancestral environment such
that in the former, an adaptive trait cannot carry out its proper function, is an
environment which is evolutionarily novel. Novel environments (in this sense)
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are mismatched to ancestral environments. In short, mismatch obtains when
an environmental change relative to the ancestral environment causes a trait
to be inhibited from fulfilling its proper function. (As mentioned earlier, I take
Cofnas to draw in part from the partial characterization in Garson (2015) of
mismatch as a psychological adaptation which is maladaptive in the novel
environment, and so I will focus my attention on the teleofunctional account.)
Adaptations allow organisms to develop and also to interact with their
environments in ways which improve their fitness. This gives us the teleofunc-
tional account’s taxonomy of mismatch types: (1) underdevelopment-inducing
(e.g. myopia), (2) ineffectiveness-inducing (e.g. peppered moths in a polluted
environment), (3) misrepresentation-inducing (e.g. supernormal stimuli), and
(4) misresponse-inducing (e.g. apartment-living cats pouncing on shadows).
One advantage of Cofnas’s view is its consonance with the adaptationism
which permeates much of the evolutionary health literature, much of it quite
explicit.11 Cofnas also provides a very helpful taxonomy of different sorts of
mismatch which is, I think, a major contribution to the body of work on
mismatch. I worry, however, that Cofnas may leave out a putative case of
mismatch which can be found in the literature.
Consider:
Island Prey: we will postulate an island population P of organisms
which has no predators at t1. Members of P have no predator-avoidance
adaptations: the organism’s lineage long ago lost such adaptations through
drift, so now the organism is not equipped to avoid predation. Suppose
that at t2 a predator finds its way to the island and begins preying with
great gusto on the predation-na¨ıve population, which is essentially help-
less: facing no selection for predator-avoidance traits, organisms within
the population are simply oblivious.12
It is important to note that in Island Prey, by stipulation, the lack of
predator-avoidance traits in P are not an adaptation to a predator-free envi-
ronment: there is no selection against such traits; they were simply not main-
tained in the population over time. The environment has changed and the
organisms are poorly-adapted to the change, and yet it seems that no partic-
ular trait is failing to perform its proper function—unless the idea is that the
predator’s jaws prevent the spinal column for performing its proper function,
which does not quite seem to be the sort of mismatch Cofnas is interested
in (since the same thing can be said any time a lion takes a gazelle, which
is surely not an evolutionarily novel situation—mismatch only occurring in
situations of evolutionary novelty, per Cofnas).
Moreover, even if there are variants in P which respond properly to the
predator, these predator-avoidance traits are not adaptations because they are
(again, by stipulation) not the result of an evolutionary history of selection for
11This general adaptationism has been criticized in, e.g., Valles (2012) and Cournoyea
(2013), and I will not engage with that worry here.
12The discussion here is inspired by discussion in Sih et al. (2010) and Sih (2013) of
evolutionary mismatch caused by novel predators.
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the traits: they are simply variants which become advantageous after an envi-
ronmental change. For both variants, however—avoidant and non-avoidant—
there is (seemingly) no evolutionary mismatch because there is no inhibition
of traits performing their proper functions. I take it that a commonsense view
of mismatch would diagnose a mismatch for the non-avoidant variants (rela-
tive to the avoidant variants, at least). If our view of mismatch would exclude
diagnosis of such cases, our view may require some work.
I take it that I have shown there is a meaningful challenge for the tele-
ofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch. I think, however, that Cofnas
has done outstanding work in unpacking many forms of organism-relevant en-
vironmental change. Thinking about mismatch in terms of function, as he does
(and as in Garson (2015)), should furnish a number of interesting objects of
investigation.
4 An optimal-environments account of evolutionary mismatch
4.1 Predictive Adaptive Responses and developmental mismatch
Gluckman et al. (2005) propose the existence of a category of phenomena
which they call Predictive Adaptive Responses (PARs). PARs comprise those
adaptive responses of organisms which reflect phenotypic plasticity with de-
layed benefits. By way of example, they discuss the effect of nutritional stress
on humans in utero, famously observed as a result of the Dutch famine in the
winter of 1944-1945.
At the end of World War II, food rationing in the Netherlands became
severe, with official rations dropping from 1800 kcal/day in late 1943 to 1400
kcal/day in October 1944, falling below 1000 kcal/day in November 1944.
Daily rations then fluctuated between 400 and 800 kcal/day until April 1945,
and then rose to over 2000 kcal/day by June 1945. A half-century later, sur-
viving Dutch adults who had been born from November 1943 through Febru-
ary 1947 were examined for obesity, glucose tolerance, and other markers of
metabolic impairment. Those adults born during or shortly after the famine—
particularly those who were in mid- or late-gestation during the famine—
displayed markedly worse glucose tolerance and insulin resistance than their
counterparts born significantly earlier or significantly later.13 In other words:
adults who had been in utero while their mothers were under significant nu-
tritional stress were more likely, later in life, to suffer from various forms of
metabolic dysfunction.
Along with insulin resistance and impaired glucose tolerance, Gluckman
et al. (2005) note that maternal nutritional stress can also lead to increased
adiposity, reduced muscle mass, and a more compact body shape. They pro-
pose that the fetus “learns” that its environment is calorie-poor, and thus
13See e.g. Ravelli et al. (1998) for more discussion of this incident and the specific re-
sults. See Hales and Barker (2013) for further discussion of the so-called “thrifty phenotype
hypothesis”.
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alters metabolic development to conserve energetic resources throughout life.
On this hypothesis, the fetus predicts a calorie-poor environment and uses its
inherent phenotypic plasticity to respond to the prediction. Gluckman et al.
(2005) and Gluckman et al. (2011) both argue that when this prediction turns
out to be incorrect—i.e. when the environment turns out to be calorie-rich—a
developmental mismatch may arise which causes the impaired glucose toler-
ance and insulin insensitivity already mentioned. The fetus has adapted devel-
opmentally to anticipated nutritional stress, and nutritional surplus may be
more likely to cause obesity, type 2 diabetes, and other health problems in the
adults who experienced nutritional stress in utero.
This mismatch, they think, is between the environment predicted by the
organism (in this case, the fetus) and the actual environment in which the or-
ganism finds itself. In this sort of case, the PAR’s interaction with the ‘wrong’
environment can plausibly result in negative fitness consequences for the organ-
ism, while encountering the optimal environment can result in positive fitness
consequences. In the next section, I propose extending the idea of ‘optimal
environment’ to generate a broader concept of evolutionary mismatch.
4.2 The main move
The existence of the PAR implies that given a particular organism’s physiology,
there is an environment in which the PAR is the appropriate response. In other
words, there is an environment in which the organism’s fitness is increased
as a result of the PAR. This can be extended: given a particular organism
and its physiology,14 there is a set of environments where that organism’s
fitness15 is maximized, i.e. is higher than in all other possible environments.
(I will present a more detailed motivation for this claim in the next section.) I
consider these environments the optimal environments for the given organism:
in all environments other than these, the organism’s fitness is sub-maximal.
In the optimal environments, the organism’s fitness is higher than in all other
environments.16
These optimal environments are not necessarily environments free of stres-
sors or competition: perhaps the organism requires stressors for its fitness to be
maximized. I make no claim about pleasant temperatures, energetic richness,
or any other specific environmental character relevant to fitness. The only vari-
14I use ‘physiology’ to refer collectively to an organism’s heritable traits (including phe-
notypic plasticity), rather than merely to genotype or merely to phenotype.
15My view does not depend on a particular analysis of evolutionary/reproductive fitness,
and the reader should feel free to insert her preferred account. Although I assume a concept
of fitness linked in some way to reproductive success, I see no reason that a concept like
that developed in Bouchard (2011) could not work here.
16To be clear, my use of the term ‘optimal environment’ is not intended to refer to opti-
mization in the sense of optimal foraging strategies or other optimality models as discussed
in e.g. Orzack and Sober (1994). If anything, the reader should take this sense of ‘optimal
environment’ to be similar to, if not quite identical with, that invoked by Gluckman and
Hanson (2006) 17-19, 33 and Levins (1968) 14: an environment in which fitness is maximized.
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Fig. 1: Mismatch at a glance
able these environments inherently have in common is the given organism’s
fitness in those environments.
Given the optimal environments (which I will refer to as Emf ), we now
turn to the organism’s actual environment, Ea. If the organism has reduced
fitness in Ea relative to Emf , then the two environments are mismatched. In
other words, when the organism is less fit in its actual environment than it
would be in its optimal environment, evolutionary mismatch obtains. We can
see this a bit more clearly in figure 1 on page 11.
Consider figure 1. Given an arbitrary organism with a maximum fitness
across all environments of 5 and a range of possible environments (E1, E2,
etc.): because the organism’s fitness is maximized in E1 and E4, E1 and E4
are its optimal environments. In all other environments, mismatch obtains.
(The reader should take 5 to quantify a fitness measure compatible with her
preferred account, should she have one.) My central claim:
CC: evolutionary mismatch obtains when an organism O is in an actual
environment Ea such that O’s fitness is lower than it would be in an
optimal environment Emf .
Let us return, now, to the earlier mismatch hypotheses: scurvy and myopia.
On the story I am telling, scurvy arises because the traits of Homo sapiens
require an abundance of vitamin C in the environment. Emf , then, is an en-
vironment rich in sources of vitamin C. In this respect, Emf matches closely
with the ancestral environment of humans.17 If Ea is an environment relatively
poor in vitamin C—say, the environment experienced on a long ocean voyage
a few centuries past—then there is a mismatch between Emf and Ea resulting
in decreased fitness of the organism.
17As mentioned above, Eaton and Konner (1985) and Konner and Eaton (2010) can be
consulted for estimates of dietary vitamin C in the diets of early humans.
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So also with myopia: the ontogeny of the human eye is such that fitness
is maximized in an environment with a broad range of focal distances (Emf ).
When the eye in a young human is subjected to an environment poor in focal
stimuli (Ea), the mismatch between these environments can cause nearsight-
edness. Now, I must acknowledge that we might dispute whether myopia gen-
uinely reduces fitness in the contemporary environment—given that we can
accommodate it with prescription lenses, eye surgery, and so forth. If myopia
does not reduce fitness, then perhaps it is caused by evolutionary mismatch
only in the case of some (perhaps most) humans, and in other cases the en-
vironmental change still causes the physiological effect but does not have a
fitness effect. If the mismatch theorist is committed to saying that myopia is
always an evolutionary mismatch (given the same physiological and environ-
mental changes), then my view would sometimes break with the literature.
(And my competitors might have an advantage here, as neither the teleofunc-
tional account nor Lloyd et al’s account require a fitness effect to diagnose a
mismatch.) I think this need not be too worrisome, however, for two reasons.
First, myopia is still the kind of problem which can result from an evolution-
ary mismatch, even if not all cases of myopia will result from an evolutionary
mismatch. Second, my view of mismatch requires an impact on the organism’s
total fitness, and so it allows for the environment to compensate for specific
negative physiological effects. (I discuss this issue further in section 6.2 below.)
Finally, consider the predation-na¨ıve population I discussed in section 3.2’s
Island Prey: the teleofunctional account seems to imply that in the absence
of a particular trait being inhibited in its proper function, there is seemingly
no evolutionary mismatch which results from the invasion of a new preda-
tor. On the optimal-environments view developed here, the invasion of a new
predator species causes an environmental change which reduces fitness in the
na¨ıve organisms, without reference to particular inhibited adaptations. More-
over, any variants in the population which are better at predator-avoidance
will probably be in a decreased state of mismatch relative to their na¨ıve con-
specifics. Thus, a pretty clear case of evolutionary mismatch seems not to be
identified by the teleofunctional account, and is correctly identified by the
optimal-environments account.
As I hope is clear from the explicit link I have drawn, this mismatch concept
also works when considering the failure of PARs: the traits of humans in utero
during the Dutch famine required a calorie-poor environment (Emf ) which was
mismatched to the actual, calorie-rich environment (Ea) they encountered.
When PARs succeed in generating an Emf concordant with Ea, there is no
mismatch—just as there is no mismatch when an organism is maximally well-
adapted to its environment.
The careful reader will note that I have not explicitly integrated the ideas
of the EEA or of evolutionary novelty and environmental change, as Cofnas
(2016) and Lloyd et al. (2011) do. The explanation for the mismatch between
Emf and Ea could comprise recent significant environmental change, but could
also comprise the emergence of new variants in a population, where the new
variant has an Emf quite different from that of its conspecifics. If Emf for the
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new variant more closely (or, for that matter, less closely) resembles Ea, then
increased (or decreased) success of the new variant relative to conspecifics may
be more easily explicable. Thus, I think that this approach plausibly includes
more biological phenomena of scientific interest than a mismatch concept wed-
ded to the EEA as a component. (I explain more below when I discuss the
EEA objection in section 6.1.)
5 The argument
5.1 The plausibility of optimal environments
Some might wonder, at this point, whether the notion of an optimal environ-
ment is even coherent. I hope to show here that on the account of mismatch
I am developing, the reader need only agree with me on some very minor as-
sumptions in order for this analysis of mismatch to marry up with phenomena
in the world. The core assumption is this:
CA: For evolutionary mismatch to be possible with respect to a par-
ticular organism, there must be at least two environments (E1 and E2)
such that in E1 the organism has higher fitness than it does in E2.
To see how this works: the optimal environment for an organism is just that
environment where the organism’s fitness is higher than in all other environ-
ments. Thus, so long as more than one fitness value is possible for an organism
across different possible environments, the environment in which the organ-
ism’s fitness is highest will be Emf , the optimal environment.
18
5.2 Coherence with the rest of the literature
I see my account lining up with the rest of the literature on evolutionary mis-
match fairly well, in three specific ways: (1) the account reflects two common
uses of the term to label particular kinds of relations; (2) the account is able to
accommodate developmental ideas of mismatch; (3) the account gives us the
right result in some putative cases. (I discuss my most significant departure
from the literature in the EEA objection below.)
First: mismatch is sometimes treated as a relation between trait/organism
and environment19 and sometimes treated as a relation between environ-
ments20. Trying to clarify what mismatch actually is—assuming that it is a
relation—requires us to identify the relata. Here, I am essentially treating Emf
18As noted in footnote 16, I realize that ‘optimal’ can be a loaded concept, and so I would
like to stress that my use of the term is not intended to imply any theoretical commitments
other than what I have explicitly stated here.
19Cf. Nesse and Williams (1994); Editorial. (2009); Lindeberg (2010).
20Cf. Gluckman et al. (2005); Gluckman and Hanson (2006); Keller and Miller (2006);
Gluckman et al. (2011); Jasienska (2013); Cofnas (2016).
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as a property of the organism. Thus, on my account, mismatch is a relation be-
tween two environments—optimal and actual—where one of the environments
is a property of the organism. This view then implies that mismatch is also
a relation between the organism and its actual environment. If mismatch is
concerned with poor fit between organisms and their environments, then poor
fit between the optimal environment and the actual environment still captures
the key idea. In other words, mismatch as a relation between environments and
mismatch as a relation between organism and environment are both captured
by the view developed here.
Second: my account draws on an existing model of developmental mismatch
to develop an integrated definition of evolutionary mismatch which incorpo-
rates the results of both developmental history and evolutionary history—the
actual physiology and psychology of the organism—to show how mismatch
occurs. When I discussed PARs in 4.1, I pointed to a form of mismatch in the
literature—developmental mismatch. Yet developmental mismatch depends in
PAR cases not on a mismatch between the EEA and the actual environment,
but between the environment ‘predicted’ by the organism and the organism’s
actual environment. By making the mismatch concept about an optimal envi-
ronment rather than either the predicted environment or the EEA, I capture
the relevant biological features of both kinda of mismatch: reduced fitness rela-
tive to the optimal environment. In PARs, the optimal environment is partially
a result of the PAR itself; in classic mismatch cases, the optimal environment
is a result of evolutionary history. In both cases, however, evolutionary history
and developmental history interact such that there is a particular set of opti-
mal environments for the organism in question. In short: this view integrates
two important senses of mismatch in the literature.
Third: my account gives us the right result for putative cases of evolution-
ary mismatch. In the literature, scurvy, myopia, and novel predators are all
cases in which mismatch is said to obtain—and my view agrees that they are
(on the plausible assumption that all these things tend to inhibit fitness).
Ultimately, the optimal-environments view excludes non-mismatch cases
(e.g. RubisCO) which one of the other views implausibly includes, and it in-
cludes mismatch cases (e.g. novel predators, poor fit of novel variants) which
one of the other views implausibly excludes.
6 Objections
6.1 The EEA objection
The EEA or a similar notion (such as ancestral environment) is central to most
accounts of evolutionary mismatch. Thus, a view of mismatch which eschews
the EEA does not map well onto how mismatch is actually talked about by
researchers. Worse, it is not clear how there is an evolutionary mismatch at all
if the environmental history of the organism’s lineage is not part of the story.
This is surely an odd way to talk about evolutionary explanations of fitness
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and health outcomes, which is ostensibly a major reason we want to discuss
mismatch in the first place!
This worry is less serious than it first appears, because the EEA plays an
indirect but clear explanatory role in the optimal environment concept: the
EEA explains the physiology of the organism; the physiology of the organism
explains the optimal environment. (This is not to say that the EEA is the
entire explanation; rather, the EEA forms part of the explanation.) Thus, the
actual biological phenomenon of evolutionary mismatch is not a discordance
between the EEA and Ea, but the EEA is an important part of the explana-
tion for the optimal environment. Moreover, due to the nature of the EEA,
the optimal environment will plausibly share many significant features (e.g.
energetic resources or temperature) with the EEA.
The emergence of new variants can have implications for mismatch, as well.
Some organisms are variants which may be less fit in their EEA and more fit
in a novel environment than most of their conspecifics, and a view of mismatch
which privileges the EEA seems likely to run into difficulties explaining this: is
mismatch no longer a meaningful category with respect to a new variant? That
seems peculiar. On the optimal-environments view, mismatch for the variant
is decreased relative to other, older variants in the population. By decentering
the EEA, mismatch can still be quantified with respect to new variants (or
the organisms which instantiate them).
An additional benefit of my view is that it makes no implicit suggestion
of the EEA as Eden: I do not privilege the EEA as a time when adaptation
was complete. Adaptation is an ongoing process due to the variable nature of
both environments and gene pools. In most environments, even ancestral en-
vironments for which an organism has evolved, some check on the population
is likely to remain. Because the EEA is often (always?) not the optimal en-
vironment for a given organism, the optimal-environments view captures this
ongoing adaptive friction.
Further, my account of mismatch helps us to understand what is occur-
ring with invasive populations: the organisms in the population are enjoying
dramatically increased fitness in a novel environment; in other words, there is
less evolutionary mismatch in the novel invaded environment than there was
in the population’s EEA. A sense of mismatch dependent on the EEA seems
obliged to remain silent regarding invasive species.
These considerations—new variants, the ongoing nature of adaptation, and
invasive populations—are all specific advantages in favor of decentering the
EEA with respect to the mismatch concept.
Some might worry here that I provide too much of an assist to the mismatch
theorist: given that they so often rely on claims about the EEA to motivate
a mismatch hypothesis, perhaps I should not propose a modification which
does not require them to keep the EEA front and center. All I can say to this
concern is that I propose to rationally reconstruct the mismatch concept. To
the extent that this makes mismatch hypotheses clearer or easier to evaluate,
I see my account as successful.
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6.2 The welfare objection
As I noted in section 3.1 on page 7, the mismatch literature often describes mis-
match as a cause of health problems. For example, Lloyd et al. (2011) suggest
in their general characterization of mismatch that mismatch can have a health
effect or a fitness effect. As Nesse and Williams (1994) (235-236) say, some
diseases which occur late in life (e.g. certain cancers) may well have little or
no fitness effect, despite their devastating impact on human health and happi-
ness. If vulnerability to these diseases is only actualized in novel environments,
one might think that this is an example of an evolutionary mismatch—even
if there is no commensurate health effect. Myopia may be another example of
a ‘mismatch’ with respect to health, but which has no fitness effect in novel,
contemporary environments. Li et al. (2018) say that mismatch is “adaptive
lag” such that adaptive psychological or physiological mechanisms have not
had time to adapt to certain environmental changes, and they explicitly in-
clude cases where the adaptive lag affects health but not fitness. (Note the
similarity of this view to that defended in Cofnas (2016), discussed above in
section 3.2.) Given these examples from the literature, one might worry that I
am too hasty to exclude health outcomes as possible cases of mismatch. I treat
fitness effects of the right kind as both necessary and sufficient for mismatch
to obtain, whereas these cases from the literature seem to treat fitness effects
as sufficient but perhaps not necessary. This disagreement with some of the
literature may be unappealing.
I will defend both a weaker claim and a stronger claim with respect to this
objection.
My weaker claim is that given the obscurity of the current discussion of
evolutionary mismatch, it is worth trying to nail down some less-ambiguous
features of the phenomenon. Surely extinctions driven by novel environmen-
tal factors are paradigm cases of increased mismatch, and as such we should
be concerned with fitness effects—a more pressing concern for biologists and
ecologists. We may think that there is a way to work out a health-focused
characterization of mismatch as well but, given that the ultimate explanations
involved are supposed to be evolutionary ones, we ought to start with a fitness
characterization. Evolution by natural selection, after all, involves differen-
tial fitness—not differential health. Working out the interaction between the
health and fitness ‘versions’ of mismatch might then be a next step (which I
do not attempt here).
My stronger claim is that if fitness mismatches and health mismatches will
not always co-occur, then we will often be talking about rather different phe-
nomena such that we need to distinguish them. If only fitness mismatch is
directly visible to natural selection, then it is not clear how health mismatch
is actually evolutionary. We might give be able to give an evolutionary ex-
planation for vulnerability to a particular health outcome, but in the absence
of a fitness effect the outcome remains evolutionarily neutral. Calling both of
these things ‘evolutionary mismatch’ when only one of them is possibly im-
plicated in selection seems to me an employment of a misleading taxonomy.
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To sharpen this point: the rapidity with which environments have changed
is supposed to be a primary cause of particular mismatch cases. For exam-
ple, Sih (2013) use the term “human-induced rapid environmental change,” or
HIREC, to describe some of the mismatch-relevant changes. Insufficient time
to adapt is treated as a major part of the explanation for mismatch in, e.g., Li
et al. (2018) discussed above. In the absence of fitness effects, however, there
is no adaptation anyway. In other words: we are told that mismatch occurs
in part because natural selection occurs more slowly than does environmental
change. But mismatch which is restricted to health effects will persist even if
the ostensibly novel environment also persists long enough for natural selec-
tion to work. Consequently, treating fitness mismatch and health mismatch as
variants of the same basic phenomenon strikes me as often likely to obscure
rather than clarify—especially if we want a mismatch concept which is viable
outside of evolutionary medicine.
6.3 The misfire objection
PAR failure may occasionally make for a hard case with respect to the optimal-
environments account of mismatch, particularly as described by Matthewson
and Griffiths (2017).21 The paper identifies four ways of “going wrong” bio-
logically. The fourth way, “heuristic failure”, is of particular interest here. A
heuristic failure occurs when an organism initiates a particular developmental
trajectory which turns out to be ‘wrong’. They refer to the type of water flea
(Daphnia) discussed in Boersma et al. (1998) and Gluckman et al. (2005).
Daphnia grows a helmet-like shell structure and a tail spike in the presence
of predators and ordinarily does not without predators. If a female Daphnia
develops these structures, her offspring will also develop these structures with-
out respect to predation risk in their own environments. Naturally, this sort
of development is costly, and is only appropriate in the presence of preda-
tors. As such, developing the helmet and tail spike in the absence of predators
reduces fitness relative to the choice not to develop—but helmeted, spikey
Daphnia will not have lower fitness relative to environments with a predation
risk (the way adults in utero during the Dutch famine might have lower fitness
in calorie-rich environments than calorie-poor environments). In other words,
Daphnia’s heuristic failure is a failure to employ the optimal strategy for an
environment—rather than a case of an environment not being optimal. This
failure of fit between development and environment seems, let us say, mis-
matchy, and perhaps the optimal-environments view is weaker for its failure
to diagnose it as mismatch.
The distinction I made suggests my answer: evolutionary mismatch expla-
nations are normally explanations of events caused by environmental changes.
Daphnia’s heuristic failure is not caused by an environmental change, but by
a developmental choice (so to speak). Reduction in fitness occurs not relative
21Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this point.
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to environments but relative to developmental trajectories. As such, it is not
properly a case of evolutionary mismatch. I suggest, then, that developmental
or behavioral choices which are inappropriate be treated as ‘misfires’.22 These
misfires would overlap significantly (perhaps entirely) with mismatch type 4
(misresponse-inducing) from Cofnas (2016). Perhaps these misfires would be
adaptive in the EEA (or in the predicted environment) but are not the fitness-
maximizing choice for the actual environment—or perhaps they might also
occur at the local level in the EEA (as when all of Daphnia’s local predators
die out or migrate, leaving her offspring to develop inappropriately). Note,
then, that some examples of misfires will also be examples of evolutionary
mismatch and some will not. This cross-classification strikes me as a good
reason to distinguish the concepts, and to employ both concepts where appro-
priate.
6.4 The overbroadness objection
The reader may object that the account is overbroad, and that this sense of
mismatch includes too many non-mismatch phenomena. This worry has three
prongs: (1) it implies that mismatch obtains for most (perhaps all) organisms;
(2) it conflates mismatch with insufficient adaptation without distinguishing
the ways insufficient adaptation can occur; (3) it suggests we talk about fitness
using a different vocabulary without justifying the additional complexity. As
a result of these concerns, the thought might go, the optimal-environments
view does not seem to add anything of scientific interest.23 I engage with each
worry in turn.
The first worry—that ‘mismatch’ (as defined on my view) is universal and,
therefore, boring—can take two forms. (1a) suggests that an improved environ-
ment can always be imagined for any given organism: there is always at least
one feature that can be altered to enhance the fitness of the organism—say, an
infinitesimal but conceivable increase in energetic resources or mating oppor-
tunities. This approach appears to assume that the fitness of all organisms can
be improved upon limitlessly, and that for any given organism there is no con-
ceivable upper bound on its fitness. This seems clearly wrong: even if nothing
else acts as a physiological limit (which seems unlikely), gamete production
seems likely to hit a ceiling in sexual reproducers. In asexual reproducers there
are typically limits on lifespan and rate of reproduction. (1b) makes a subtler
point: given that few if any organisms find themselves in their optimal environ-
ment, mismatch is so pervasive that its presence is unremarkable. I agree: the
mere presence of mismatch is relatively unremarkable. The degree of mismatch
and variations in mismatch, however, can be critically important: the sudden
jump in mismatch for the dinosaurs 65 million years ago—the sudden increase
in distance between the dinosaurs’ optimal and actual environments—helps
22My use of the term is inspired by Maner and Kenrick (2010)’s discussion of social
anxiety.
23I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for these helpful points.
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explain the K-T extinction. Variations in mismatch—where environmental
changes cause decreases in mismatch for some organisms, and increases for
others—can help explain evolutionary change. As a practical matter, a biol-
ogist might not often be explicitly concerned with the question of whether
mismatch obtains at all, but surely extent of, cause of, and variation in mis-
match are all worthy objects of investigation.
The second worry is that this view simply defines mismatch as sub-maximal
fitness, when really mismatch ought to be seen as a particular path to sub-
maximal fitness—e.g. a functional account like that offered by Cofnas (2016).
I think this objection is mistaken. Mismatch on my view does encompass a
broad variety of biological phenomena, but it does not require that these be
treated as an undifferentiated mass any more than defining fitness as expected
reproductive success requires us to treat different fitness measurements as an
undifferentiated mass. The ways that mismatch can happen—the plethora of
ways, in other words, that organisms’ optimal and actual environments can
differ—are surely subject to interesting taxonomical work. As I suggested in
my discussion of the teleofunctional account above, environmental inhibition
of traits’ proper functions are sometimes fitness-reducing, which suggests that
one interesting kind of mismatch involves such an environmental inhibition.
But as I showed, not all mismatches are caused by the inhibition of a proper
function. I do not set out to create a mismatch taxonomy in this paper, but
the account proposed certainly does not prevent such work.
The third worry suggests that if all genuine mismatch cases are really cases
of sub-maximal fitness, we might as well stick to talking about fitness and ig-
nore mismatch entirely. The antecedent here is true, but does not imply the
consequent. The optimal-environments view calls our attention to at least two
objects of investigation: the maximal fitness of an organism, and the optimal
environment. Each of these is ecologically and evolutionarily relevant. The
maximal fitness of an organism, if discovered, allows us to identify the ceiling
of its likely rate of reproduction (assuming a fitness concept grounded in re-
production). In other words, it allows a researcher to determine the maximal
ability of an organism to increase its share of the population, which in turn
allows for a prediction of changes in biotic communities. The optimal envi-
ronment, if known, allows ecologists and evolutionists to identify the likely
effects of a particular environmental change on the populations and commu-
nities they study. This view of mismatch places both of those ideas into a
broader framework.
6.5 The objection of peculiar cases
Consider a case:
Gamete Harvester: a group of extremely-well-resourced, morally-
troubled scientists decide to prevent evolutionary mismatch for one
human male. To do so, they raise Fred from zygote to death, carefully
controlling his environmental factors to maximize sperm production
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and quality. Their reproductive technology is such that they success-
fully ensure that (1) Fred physiologically could not produce a single
sperm more over the course of his life, and that (2) every single one of
Fred’s sperm is used to create a viable embryo, which is then raised to
reproductive maturity. Consequently, Fred’s descendant contribution to
the next generation is many millions of offspring.24
Gamete Harvester suggests that the notion of ‘optimal environment’ as I have
defined it can include some very peculiar cases. It may be counterintuitive to
think that some highly artificial environments are the optimal environment for
organisms. After all, surely including environments like that in the Gamete
Harvester suggests that very few organisms ever evade massive mismatch.
Perhaps it is wrong to use an account which allows in unnatural cases.
An initial response is immediately available: it seems unlikely that biolo-
gists will have any interest in biologically implausible hypothetical cases such
as Gamete Harvester. Thus, the (ostensible) failure of the account in such a
case is not particularly worrisome: biological concepts need not be compatible
with all possible cases. I take it that this is in the spirit of the skepticism
towards the “ingenious construction of fictional counterexamples” expressed
in Millikan (1989).25
Now allow me to attempt some defense in depth, here, on the supposition
that some critics will find the Millikan-style move above unappealing. To that
end, I offer two further responses, one theoretical and the other practical. The
theoretical response is quick: given the huge numbers of gametes produced
by human males, why do men not achieve the level of reproductive success
in the Gamete Harvester? Well, for the simple reason that they are never
in such environments! But were they to be in such environments, then they
would have that level of reproductive success. In other words, they would be
fitter in the Gamete Harvester environment (though perhaps not happier).
The optimal environment for the organism’s physiology helps to explain its
failure to achieve physiologically maximal reproductive success. (For the sake
of the argument I conceded that such an absurd project is possible, but I do
not think it is at all obvious that such an intervention could be achieved.)
The practical response draws on our conservation interests: although the
EEA of an endangered species will presumably provide some insight on how
best to maximize the reproductive success of its population, it seems plausible
that simple historic reenactment will sometimes be inadequate. In other words,
sometimes human intervention in highly artificial environments (such as zoos)
may be necessary to preserve species of interest. The optimal-environments ac-
count of evolutionary mismatch thus helps to explain fitness variation across
natural and artificial environments. In short: acknowledging that artificial en-
vironments may maximize fitness is actually a virtue of my account.
24It may be the case that fitness is not actually maximized in this case because certain
facts of human physiology make this impossible, or it relies on the wrong fitness concept. I
suspect the former is actually true. Nevertheless, I think the case worth discussing for the
benefit of those who think otherwise.
25Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this response.
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An interesting case here is that of the Lord Howe Island Phasmid (Dryoco-
celus australis), also known as the tree lobster. By the 1960s, the tree lobster
was believed to be extinct—apparently as a result of predation by black rats,
an invasive species on Lord Howe Island, to which the tree lobsters were en-
demic. In 2001, a small population of only 24 individuals was discovered living
around a bush on (relatively) nearby Ball’s Pyramid, an island only a few
hundred meters wide. Two male-female pairs were taken from the island. One
pair went to Insektus (a private facility in Sydney); the other went to the
Melbourne Zoo. Although the Sydney pair reproduced successfully, the pop-
ulation quickly died out. The Melbourne Zoo, however, was successful: the
habitat for the initial breeding pair was a climate-controlled glasshouse facil-
ity. Eggs (laid into a sand container specifically for that purpose) were then
placed in an identical facility, and buried in different substrates to maximize
chances of success. As of 2009, the Melbourne Zoo-raised population included
700 insects (and thousands of eggs), and plans are underway to repopulate
Lord Howe Island with the tree lobster (Priddel et al. (2003); Honan (2008);
Buckley et al. (2009); Carlile et al. (2009)).
The Melbourne Zoo environment was artificial—a peculiar case, in other
words—in a number of ways: it was carefully climate-controlled; it was free of
predators; it had a staff to administer nutrient solutions to sick tree lobsters
(Honan (2008)). Given that the initial male and female brought to the zoo now
have hundreds of living individual offspring (compared to a wild population
still at similar numbers as when first discovered, per Carlile et al. (2009)), it
seems obvious that a tree lobster’s fitness will be substantially elevated in the
zoo relative to the bush on Ball’s Pyramid. Even if the zoo is not quite the
tree lobster’s optimal environment, I think it is plausible to say that there is a
greater degree of mismatch for the tree lobster on Ball’s Pyramid than at the
Melbourne Zoo. In other words: by reducing the severity of mismatch for the
tree lobster, the zoo was able to substantially improve reproductive outcomes
and, thus, probability of species survival.
A final point: some of the counterintuitiveness of Gamete Harvester may
come from the fact that it is a case of high fitness and low welfare.26 The case,
then, neatly illustrates why we ought to be cautious when treating fitness and
health interchangeably—or at least imprecisely. This is an extreme example of
how the two can come apart. I think this does not militate strongly in favor of a
welfare-centered mismatch account, however: I assume that no actual clinician
would recommend a treatment regimen like Gamete Harvester, no matter how
valuable she generally found evolutionary mismatch as a clinical concept. For
more on this, see section 6.2 above.
6.6 The elephants without tusks objection
Another result which might worry us: on my view, mismatch might stay the
same or even be exacerbated for an organism at the same time that its relative
26Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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fitness increases. Consider a variant of elephant which is tuskless (¬TE). Pre-
sumably, ¬TE’s optimal environment would be an environment where tusks
are less essential. It should be easy to see why ¬TE faces some degree of mis-
match in the elephant’s EEA: tusks aid in defense, in digging, and so forth.
Environmental change is occurring, however. Over decades of hunting African
elephants for their tusks, poachers appear to have exerted very strong selection
pressure against developing tusks, resulting in a sharp increase in the number
of elephants without tusks. In other words, selection against tusked elephants
(TE) and in favor of ¬TE is ongoing.27
In the poaching environment, ¬TE has a higher relative fitness than TE,
because poachers do not have a reason to target ¬TE. This is perhaps trou-
bling for the optimal-environments account because ¬TE is still in a state of
evolutionary mismatch: its absolute fitness28 (we shall assume) does not vary
across poaching and non-poaching environments, and so the extent to which
mismatch obtains for ¬TE remains the same. In other words, ¬TE is no less
fit when poachers are around than it would be in its EEA—nor is ¬TE more fit
in absolute terms. Given that ¬TE is apparently out-competing TE, though,
one might think it odd to say that in the poaching environment ¬TE faces
evolutionary mismatch.
The worry about changes in relative fitness without a correlated change in
mismatch illustrates an advantage for my view: a view of mismatch focused
only on relative fitness values will offer no explanation for declining demo-
graphic and reproductive success for the population as a whole; it can only
explain change in frequencies of particular variants. The optimal-environments
view can explain the change in frequencies: because the absolute fitness of TE
in the poaching environment crashed (due to the increased mismatch with
TE’s optimal environment), while the absolute fitness of ¬TE held steady
(due to no increase in mismatch), ¬TE trends toward a larger frequency in
the population. At the same time, the priority I place on absolute fitness in
particular environments allows us to explain why the population as a whole
may decline: even though ¬TE has a higher relative fitness than TE, ¬TE is
still not in its optimal environment and thus is still not very fit in absolute
terms.
In short: by defining mismatch as a difference of absolute fitness in ac-
tual versus optimal environments, the optimal environment view can explain
both the phenomena that a relative fitness view of evolutionary mismatch can
explain, and also some phenomena that it cannot.
6.7 The relative fitness objection
When we tell evolutionary stories, we tell stories of differential reproduction:
evolution occurs not merely as a result of how well- (or poorly-) suited an
organism is to its environment, but also as a result of how well-suited it is
27See Jachmann et al. (1995) and Owens and Owens (2009) for some discussion of this.
28Absolute fitness, as opposed to relative fitness.
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relative to other members of its population. Change in the frequency of variants
over time is not simply caused by the demographic success of a particular
variant; it is caused by the relative demographic successes of all variants in
the population.
With that in mind, consider:
Weird Mismatch: two organisms, O1 and O2 are in an environment
E1 such that O1 has a fitness of 2 and O2 has a fitness of 1. Consider
another environment, E2, in which O1 has a fitness of 4 and O2 has
a fitness of 8. For convenience, I will stipulate that E2 is the optimal
environment (as I have defined it here) for both O1 and O2.
By the view I have been developing, there is an evolutionary mismatch
for both organisms in E1. Yet we might think this is odd: while it is true
that O1 has reduced fitness in E1 relative to E2, it is also the case that O1
has higher relative fitness. In E1, O1 will tend to increase in its proportion
of the population relative to O2, and yet in the environment where it is less
“mismatched”, O1 will tend to decline as a proportion of the population.
One might think that an organism must surely be considered better-matched
in an environment where it has a higher relative fitness and will trend towards
a larger proportion of the population.29 Indeed, one might suspect that a no-
tion of mismatch which does not seem to predict evolutionary change properly
is not a very useful concept at all.
I consider this the most forceful objection to my characterization, but I
think that it can be resolved satisfactorily.
First: as in the examples mentioned in section 2 on page 3, the negative
fitness effects of something like scurvy are treated as mismatch due to an
environmental change—not ‘mismatch’ which is actually just lower relative
fitness. After all, a sufficiently vitamin C-poor environment may lower the
fitness of all members of the population, and it seems plausible that we would
want to say that mismatch occurs. The relative fitness objection requires that
we only acknowledge mismatch when environmental change induces lowered
relative fitness. My read of the literature is that this simply does not marry
up well with the way the concept is used: environmental change can cause
evolutionary mismatch for all variants within a population. Weird Mismatch
is only a problem if we commit to mismatch as reduced relative fitness, which
gives us other counterintuitive results. This view of mismatch also does not
seem to get us additional clear cases left out by my proposal, and does not
seem to handle cases which cannot be handled simply by talking about relative
fitness simpliciter.
Consider:
Extinction: an island population P of large, flightless birds, long pro-
tected from serious predation, is exposed to humans. The birds, lack-
29Credit for this specific objection goes to Andrew Sih of UC Davis. Several other concerns
raised in this section emerged as a result of our conversation, but not all were directly
expressed the way I have raised them here. Any failures of clarity or plausibility are my
own.
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ing fear or any other predation-avoidance adaptations, treat the new
predators with curiosity or indifference, and thus are easily hunted.
Consequently, fitness across all variants within P crashes and it goes
extinct.
Like Island Prey in section 3.2, Extinction gives us a story of a population
exposed to a radical environmental change which results in across-the-board
fitness reductions within P . Were we to insist on a relative fitness view of
mismatch, we would be obliged to say that no mismatch occurs in Extinction.
I take it that if evolutionary mismatch can be anything in biology, it can be
the sort of thing that results in an extinction event. Thus, the relative fitness
view gives us the wrong result.
Finally: in the elephants without tusks objection (section 6.6 on page 21), I
suggested that change in mismatch levels among the variants of a population—
ostensibly as the result of environmental change—probably can be used to
explain some kinds of evolutionary change. If so, then it seems the optimal-
environments view will still allow us to talk about many of the sorts of bi-
ological phenomena for which we might be tempted to use a relative fitness
approach to mismatch. Keeping the concepts distinct gives us a different way
of thinking about connected phenomena. Further, doing so provides a new
target of investigation: the optimal environment.
6.8 The types and tokens objection
Perhaps my focus on individual organisms does not sufficiently reflect bio-
logical practice, which is primarily concerned with the differential success of
variants (types) rather than the success of particular individuals (tokens). By
giving an account of mismatch focused on the individual organism, one might
think, I am giving an account of a concept which is unlikely to be fruitful.
I will respond in three ways. First, defining biological concepts at the or-
ganism level is certainly done by philosophers of biology: cf. Mills and Beatty
(1979) for a well-known example. Second, given the particular ways that mis-
match is discussed in the literature (particularly the clinical literature), a
focus on individual cases seems to meet the need of those doing research on
evolutionary mismatch. Third, I think the optimal-environments account can
plausibly be extended to variants in a population, something like this:
Variant mismatch: evolutionary mismatch obtains for a variant V in
a population P when V is in an actual environment Ea such that V ’s
fitness is lower than it would be in an optimal environment Emf .
As noted in footnote 16, I take it that this sense of optimal environment is
not too different from the sense of optimal environments described in Gluck-
man and Hanson (2006) and Levins (1962, 1968). A particular variant’s op-
timal environment is that in which its “best performance” (with respect to
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fitness) occurs. Thus, extending Levins’ view to think about mismatch, evo-
lutionary mismatch obtains for any variant in a population not in that opti-
mal environment. (Presumably this would be characterized as mean mismatch
across all organisms with the variant in question, but I am not committed to
this approach.)
The argument can run similar to the argument in section 5: if we grant that
a particular variant can be fitter in some environments than others, then at
least one of those environments will be the optimal environment. If we move to
the level of variants, we will also likely have a constrained set of environments
to consider (relative to an individual organism’s optimal environment set),
given the reduced need to consider many individual traits and how they might
interact with different environments. This, in turn, should help us get some
traction with the challenge of identifying optimal environments in the case of
individual organisms. (Indeed, in many cases the variant level may be sufficient
for the purposes of the researcher.)
7 Taking stock
In this paper, I have proposed that evolutionary mismatch be conceptualized
as a relation between the fitness-maximizing, or optimal, environment for an
organism, Emf and the actual environment of the organism, Ea. I have given
some reasons to think that this is a plausible concept of evolutionary mis-
match. I have shown that the two primary competing views of evolutionary
mismatch each count some non-mismatch cases as mismatch cases, and count
some mismatch cases as non-mismatch cases. The view that I develop avoids
these problems, while being amenable to incorporating the key insights of
competing accounts.
The real test for the optimal-environments view will be its fruitfulness. If
the view is useful, it will provide new ways to think about questions which lie
close to the foundations of evolutionary biology. I have argued that the view
gives us specific new targets for investigation—the physiologically maximal fit-
ness of an organism, and the organism’s optimal environment—and suggested
that these concepts can play clarifying and explanatory roles in evolutionary
biology, in ecology and conservation biology, in developmental biology and the
study of phenotypic plasticity, and other areas of the life sciences.
Further development of this view will be beneficial. First, I have given a
sketch of variant mismatch in the previous section, but it is not yet fully-
developed. Conceptual work enabling the study of mismatch at a population
level is an obvious next step. Second, I have not laid out a methodology for
identifying maximal fitness or optimal environments. Third and finally, here
I have treated on mismatch as a fitness phenomenon. Given that many mis-
match researchers want to do clinical work with the concept, however, another
necessary step will be to elucidate the relationship between health and fitness
with respect to evolutionary mismatch. Work remains to be done, but I take
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it that I have shown that the optimal-environments view is, at its foundation,
plausible and worth developing further.
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